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OUTSOURCING AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE:  
A NEGATIVE CURVILINEAR EFFECT 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study asks how a firm‘s degree of outsourcing across all activities influences financial 
performance. We argue there is an optimal degree of outsourcing, where firms outsource 
some activities yet integrate others, and that deviations lower performance in a negatively 
curvilinear fashion.  We find empirical support, using 1995 and 1998 data on a sample of 
manufacturing businesses in the Netherlands, and show that the steepness of the curve 
increases under conditions of high uncertainty.  We show the magnitude of the uncertainty 
effect on performance outcomes through a post hoc scenario analysis.  Thus we provide a 
specific, theoretically and empirically grounded prediction of how outsourcing affects 
performance with implications for theory and practice. 
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Firms face intense competitive pressures due to factors like technological change and 
globalisation.  In response to these concerns, companies, both large and small, are 
increasingly outsourcing their activities by shifting what they traditionally handled in-house 
to external suppliers.  There has been so much outsourcing in areas like IT that scholars are 
now starting to ask whether some of that outsourcing will be reversed, in the form of 
backsourcing (Whitten and Leidner, 2006). Outsourcing commonly refers to the purchase 
of a good or service that was previously provided internally (Lacity and Hirschheim, 1995; 
Rothery and Robertson, 1995).  In line with this broad notion, we define outsourcing in this 
paper as the transfer of activities to an external source. 
According to Coase (1937), the existence of organisations can be attributed to 
market failure that induces transaction costs.  Thus firms are constantly weighing the total 
costs, including transaction and production costs, of the market and hierarchy modes.  In 
the transaction costs line of research, Williamson (1975, 1981) made important theoretical 
contributions, which have been empirically justified by various others (e.g., Hennart, 1988; 
Walker and Weber, 1984).  In recent years resource-based arguments have been added to 
the explanation of outsourcing (Barney 1999; Leiblein, Reuer, and Dalsace, 2002; 
Marshall, McIvor, and Lamming, 2007) as have real options (Leiblein, 2003), agency 
(Holmström and Roberts, 1998) and industrial organisation arguments (Shy and Stenbacka, 
2005).  Thus a fairly good understanding has emerged as to what drives the decision to 
outsource, or integrate, a specific activity. 
Yet in the empirical reality we observe that firms outsource some but not all of their 
activities.  As extreme examples they for instance retain in-house outsourcing decisions and 
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supplier management and externalise auditing activities and the production of electricity.  
This leaves room for theoretical grounding of the outsourcing phenomenon at the firm 
level. Any value chain needed to produce products for a customer can be seen as a bundle 
of activities governed by a nexus of treaties and these activities are performed either 
internally or externally (Aoki, Gustafsson, and Williamson, 1990; Williamson, 1995). So 
for every individual activity a governance choice must be made (make or buy) and the sum 
of all governance choices determines a firm‘s overall level of outsourcing, which will differ 
for every individual firm. In this paper we ask: how does the overall outsourcing level 
influence firm performance (cf. D‘Aveni and Ravenscraft, 1994)?  
This above research question is answered in four steps. First, we provide a 
theoretical argument that an optimal degree of outsourcing exists for every individual firm, 
where the firm‘s overall outsourcing level leads to the best financial performance.  Second, 
we specify the shape of the outsourcing-performance relationship at the firm level, 
suggesting this relationship is negatively curvilinear in nature. Subsequently, we argue that 
market uncertainty makes the negative consequences of deviating from the optimum more 
severe.  Third, we provide an empirical test using a sample of over 1,100 businesses from 
census data in the Netherlands which supports the argument and the specified relationship. 
Fourth, we show that market uncertainty has a negative impact on the outsourcing-
performance curve. This implies that taking the right outsourcing decisions becomes more 
important for firms as uncertainty increases. We illustrate this further through a post hoc 
analysis, where three scenarios, of low, medium, and high uncertainty are compared. 
 
 3 
OUTSOURCING  
Because there are substantial differences among the various activities that form part of a 
value chain, most analyses of make-or-buy decisions have concentrated on a limited set of 
activities, for instance, manufacturing (Leiblein et al., 2002), services (Murray and Kotabe, 
1999), information technology (Poppo and Zenger, 1998) or retail activities (Kaipia and 
Tanskanen, 2003). Extant literature has provided much insight into what determines 
whether firms integrate (make) or outsource (buy) a particular activity. 
Undoubtedly, transaction cost economics (TCE) (Williamson, 1975) has made key 
contributions to our understanding of make-or-buy decisions, although its limitations have 
also been highlighted (Barney, 1999; Marshall et al., 2007). Asset specificity has been 
shown to be a key determinant of make-or-buy decisions (Leiblein, 2003; Walker and 
Weber, 1984; Williamson, 1981). The lower the asset specificity of an activity, the easier it 
becomes to write complete contracts, and the more likely is outsourcing.  Uncertainty has 
similarly been identified as a determinant of the make-or-buy decision (Williamson, 1981).  
The original argument maintains that in highly uncertain environments, contracting will be 
incomplete, transaction costs will rise and it is hard to reach an affordable agreement with a 
supplier.  If uncertainty is lower, a higher degree of outsourcing is possible, especially if 
low uncertainty occurs in the joint presence of low asset specificity (Williamson, 1985).  
 Firm capabilities and resources are a firm-level indicator of what can and can not 
usefully be outsourced (Barney, 1999).  The resource-based view (RBV) predicts that firms 
with a rich competence base that can be deployed for undertaking a given activity may 
internalise that activity.  For those firms that are less well prepared internally, outsourcing 
is more viable. Thus having many useful capabilities for an activity reduces the likelihood 
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the activity will be outsourced (Barney, 1999; Leiblein et al., 2002). The most relevant 
comparison to determine the strength of firm capabilities is with potential suppliers, not 
with competing firms. Finally, TCE and RBV considerations appear to strengthen one 
another (Leiblein, 2003). 
The outsourcing literature has started to integrate RBV, knowledge, and competence 
considerations in outsourcing decisions (Barney, 1999; Leiblein et al., 2002; Poppo and 
Zenger, 1998) in addition to transaction cost reasoning. From an industry structure and 
positioning perspective (Porter, 1985), outsourcing is an approach particularly suitable for 
cost minimisation strategies given its ability to reduce production and procurement costs.  
Indeed outsourcing is most useful in commodity markets and has an effect of strengthening 
price-based competition (Cachon and Harker, 2002) since external suppliers are more likely 
to provide standardised solutions, reducing the possibilities for successful differentiation 
from competitors. Leiblein (2003) has suggested that the make-or-buy decision can also be 
framed as a real option, where outsourcing and vertical integration are undertaken to create 
a platform for future investments and strategising. The larger the uncertainty surrounding 
decision-making, the more valuable such options will become. 
At the industry level, bandwagoning may have an impact on supply structures.  If 
all competitors in an industry outsource, they actually induce an improvement in the scale 
and efficiency of operations of suppliers.  Furthermore, there are other industry factors such 
as the need for local responsiveness versus global integration (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; 
Prahalad and Doz, 1987), the existence of supply clusters within reach of the firm, and the 
effectiveness of using information technology in linking various vertical stages of 
production and the nature of competitive positioning that are meaningful predictors in the 
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context of outsourcing.  We believe industry, including product characteristics, to be the 
most important level for explaining outsourcing.  
There also national-level explanations for the level of outsourcing.  In countries 
with institutional voids, for example, in terms of weak property rights regimes, vertical 
integration again is often a preferred solution because it provides the only guarantee against 
opportunistic behaviour and contractual hazards (Teece, 1986).  More generally, the lower 
the level of market imperfections in a country, the higher the level of outsourcing by firms 
in that country will be (Williamson, 1985). In conclusion, current literature has identified a 
range of predictor variables of outsourcing, which can broadly be seen to operate at the 
activity (transaction), firm, industry and institutional environment levels. Activities will 
vary in their scores on these variables. Based on the sum of these scores, it will make more 
or less economic sense for a firm to outsource a given activity. 
 
Outsourcing and performance 
The link from outsourcing to performance is less well developed empirically (Gilley and 
Rasheed, 2000; Masten, 1993).  Recent normative literature (Domberger, 1998; Quinn, 
1999) and managerial practice, where outsourcing has been one of the buzzwords (Porter, 
1997), suggest that outsourcing is one of the key sources for increasing a firm‘s 
performance. 
Various arguments have been provided for such a positive relationship. Because 
outsourcing makes a firm more nimble, it allows firms to increasingly focus on its core 
activities (Domberger, 1998; Quinn, 1999). Outsourcing also lowers production costs 
because specialised suppliers are used (Hendry, 1995; Kotabe, 1998) and it increases a 
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firm‘s strategic flexibility to deal with technological or volume fluctuations (Balakrishnan 
and Wernerfelt, 1986; Semlinger, 1993). Outsourcing helps to avoid the costs associated 
with bureaucracy typically associated with production inside the firm (D‘Aveni and 
Ravenscraft, 1994; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Finally outsourcing opens up the 
possibility of obtaining rents from relations with suppliers (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Linder, 
2004). 
But vertical integration also has its merits. Older literature in fact took integration as 
the default mode through which competitive advantage could be obtained (Capon, Farley, 
and Hoenig 1990; D‘Aveni and Ravenscraft, 1994; Harrigan, 1986). And the world of 
practice was long infatuated by the benefits of vertical integration, including its ability to 
increase bargaining power. This older trend is perhaps best exemplified by the Fordist 
production model, which takes integration to the extreme. 
Integration can produce scope economies especially at those intersections between 
activities where value is created (D‘Aveni and Ravenscraft, 1994; Porter, 1997).1 
Outsourcing can lead to hollowing out and an accompanying loss of competitive distinction 
(Bettis, Bradley, and Hamel, 1992; Chesbrough and Teece, 1996), a danger especially 
eminent in industries where little value is added by integration and assembly (Brusoni, 
Prencipe, and Pavitt, 2001). Outsourcing increases transaction costs (Williamson, 1975) in 
subtle, not so visible ways (Masten, 1993), due to the difficulty of monitoring behaviour of 
                                                          
1
 It is an interesting paradox that supporters of outsourcing are often found within the camp of the inside-out 
view of firm strategy, which argues competitive advantage starts with core competences and firm resources 
inside the firm, while the opponents of outsourcing are those that use an outside-in approach, arguing 
competitive advantages arises from analysing the industry structure and positioning the firm in that industry. 
One would expect an approach based on internal strengths to have a bias for internalisation and one that 
primarily looks at the environment to display more of a belief in externalisation. This can perhaps be 
explained by the former approach focusing on specialisation, which encourages organisational fragmentation, 
and the latter on the creation of interfaces between activities, which encourages integration. 
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external suppliers and the related threat of opportunism. Related, outsourcing raises co-
ordination costs because all these external supplier relations will have to be managed and it 
can make learning and innovation more difficult because of the difficulties of appropriating 
innovative rents from suppliers (Hendry, 1995; Nooteboom, 1999). 
Perhaps not surprisingly then, empirical research displays a similar pattern where 
some studies found a positive relationship between outsourcing and performance, while 
others found either a negative relation or no connection at all.  In a meta-analysis, Capon, 
Farley, and Hoenig (1990) found that vertical integration was positively linked to 
performance in some cases and negatively in others.  D‘Aveni and Ravenscraft (1994) 
found that vertical integration has a moderately positive impact on performance, yet 
Murray, Kotabe, and Wildt (1995) found a positive relationship between the extent of 
external sourcing and financial performance (i.e., ROS, ROI and ROE).  Then there are 
some studies pointing to no relationship at all.  Neither Gilley and Rasheed (2000) nor 
Leiblein et al (2002) were able to establish a significant direct relationship between 
outsourcing and performance and both studies argued for a moderated effect.  
So evidence on this topic is inconclusive and the influence of the make-or-buy 
decision on a firm‘s effectiveness remains unclear. We suggest that rather than simply 
producing further empirical data, this issue is best tackled through a reconceptualisation of 
the relation between outsourcing and performance at the firm level. 
 
Outsourceability 
Earlier we noted that activities vary in the extent to which they are suitable candidates for 
outsourcing. We will apply the term outsourceability, to capture the degree to which it 
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makes sense for a firm to outsource a given activity to improve performance. In other 
words, an activity‘s outsourceability reflects the relative merits, in performance terms, of 
outsourcing versus integrating that activity given the characteristics of the activity 
(transaction), the firm, its industry and its institutional environment. If an activity scores 
high on outsourceability, that activity is best outsourced from a performance perspective. 
Reversely, if it scores low, it is best integrated into the firm. Intuitively, few would argue 
that the outsourceability of a CEO is high, which is why we do not see CEOs being 
outsourced. Likewise the construction of office space by an organisation (that is not itself a 
construction company) will score high on outsourceability and IBM indeed does not build 
its own offices. But there are other instances when the decision is less clear-cut. We would 
rate these as cases of medium outsourceability, including the decision whether or not to 
outsource semiconductor production (Leiblein et al, 2002) or transportation (Ashenbaum, 
Maltz, and Rabinovich, 2005).  These are often the outsourcing decisions that academics 
have studied, precisely because medium outsourceability implies there is substantial 
variance in these decisions. To clarify, we use the term outsourceability below as an 
intermediate concept to bridge theory on outsourcing at the transaction level to our 
predictions of the outsourcing–performance relationship at the firm level.  We do not 
directly measure outsourceability in the data. Also, we do not suggest that the level of 
outsourceability has any particular performance implications; these implications only arise 
when firms make choices about their outsourcing levels.  In other words, there is no 
presumption here that high outsourceability is better or worse than low outsourceability.  
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
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As long as managers maintain some level of purposeful choice, outsourceability explains 
why some activities are outsourced and others are not, reflecting Hendry‘s (1995) call for 
striking a balance between outsourcing and integration. But it also helps us understand what 
performance results outsourcing choices produce.  When a firm outsources an activity that 
should be best kept in-house, this will result in a suboptimal performance outcome (Masten, 
1993).
2
  Likewise the integration of an activity that ought to be outsourced will lower the 
performance of that activity.  When, however, a firm matches its governance choice to the 
outsourceability of the underlying activity, it reaches the best possible performance 
outcome (Masten, 1993; Williamson, 1995).  In the aggregate, a firm that is correct in all of 
its make-or-buy decisions therefore reaches optimal performance. Once the firm starts to 
make mistakes, its performance will suffer. There is, in other words, an optimal degree of 
outsourcing for all of a firm‘s activities and deviations from that optimum will lower 
performance. 
 But what will the shape of these performance decreases be?  Proponents of 
outsourcing argue that heavy reliance on internal sourcing leads to poor performance, and it 
is at its worst when firms apply it by default (Domberger, 1998). Firms that internally 
procure almost all of their activities will be so far removed from the market that their 
efficiency tends to suffer.  In other words, if almost no outsourcing is undertaken, there will 
be no benchmark available that would permit a firm to judge how efficient its own 
activities are relative to the market. A firm like that could face staggering production costs 
                                                          
2
 Please note that optimising performance according to the degree of outsourcing alone will clearly not 
provide a firm with its optimal global performance. 
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as some U.S. and British conglomerates discovered in the 1980s and 1990s before being 
dissolved.  If outsourcing is undertaken, such a beacon exists.  
Those who have warned against the dangers of excessive outsourcing likewise point 
to the consequences of very high outsourcing. The disadvantages of outsourcing are at their 
worst when firms outsource (almost) everything, so it is suggested.  Firms that become 
hollow or virtual lack a solid basis for competing and can neither innovate enough nor learn 
much (Chesbrough and Teece, 1996; Kotabe, 1998).  In both cases, if firms do not adjust 
outsourcing levels according to the outsourceability of their activities, their performance 
will suffer. 
This suggests that the further away from the optimum sourcing level a firm is, the 
more its performance is likely to suffer from taking the wrong make-or-buy decision. Near 
the optimum there is a range of activities, those with a medium level of outsourceability, 
for which it makes little difference whether they are outsourced or not.  But towards the 
extremes of complete integration and full outsourcing, activities are found for which the 
optimal choice is much more discrete (i.e., outsourceability of these activities is either low 
or high).  In other words, the pace at which performance decreases when we move away 
from the optimum increases faster, the further away we are from the optimum.  And if the 
outsourceability of activities is distributed in a roughly linear manner, this implies 
mathematically that the performance gaps from taking the wrong decision follow a negative 
curvilinear pattern. 
 To summarise, an activity has a certain level of outsourceability, which follows 
from predictors proposed by various theories.  If we combine all of the activities in a value 
chain, optimum performance is obtained when all governance choices reflect the activities‘ 
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outsourceability. Deviations from that optimum are costly and increasingly so as the 
mismatch between governance choice and outsourceability grows. As a result we obtain 
that a firm‘s performance is a negative curvilinear function of its degree of outsourcing. 
 
Hypothesis 1:  There is a negative curvilinear relationship between a firm’s 
level of outsourcing and its performance. 
 
Why has earlier research not uncovered this negative curvilinear relationship?  In our view, 
there are four explanations for this. Theoretically, authors have usually focused on either 
the benefits of vertical integration or those of outsourcing and usually done so for a limited 
range of activities.  Rarely have they tried to integrate both arguments in their work.  Two 
key exceptions are D‘Aveni and Ravenscraft (1994) and Murray, Kotabe, and Wildt (1995) 
who look at both the positives and the drawbacks of outsourcing.  However, neither study 
suggests a non-linear relationship.  
In addition many studies on outsourcing, D‘Aveni and Ravenscraft (1994) again 
being a notable exception, have analyzed one activity or a limited set of activities. Since the 
outsourceability of activities varies wildly, the outcome in terms of how outsourcing affects 
performance is simply a function of the activity studied and the context in which it is 
studied. For instance, if one were to study outsourcing of CEOs, to the extent this exists, it 
would surely tend to decrease performance.  So a focus on a wider range of activities will 
influence what outsourcing-performance relation is observed. Corporations or their 
divisions announce they will increase outsourcing levels, to increase focus, cut costs or for 
some other reason, without a priori specifying the activities that will be outsourced.  
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Outsourcing decision-making therefore at least partly takes place at a more aggregate level 
of analysis. 
A methodological limitation in previous sourcing literature is that most studies 
focus on a single moment in time.  The effects of outsourcing, however, may not be 
immediate.  A second methodological problem relates to the nature of the dependent 
variable measuring performance.  Much earlier research on this topic relied on perceptual 
data collected through surveys. Although surveys allow for more degrees of freedom in 
gathering data, responses may be subject to common method bias and low response rates.  
Secondary data can therefore provide a fruitful complement. 
 
The moderating effect of uncertainty 
Strategic management research considers market uncertainty to be an important factor 
affecting major strategic decisions, such as the decision to vertically integrate (Porter, 1980; 
Williamson, 1975).  The role of uncertainty in outsourcing, especially in transaction cost 
economics is contested terrain (Williamson, 1995), with some arguing for a positive effect, 
others for a negative effect or only a moderated effect. For instance, using perception data 
Gilley and Rasheed (2000) found that firms in less dynamic environments could increase 
performance through outsourcing. And Leiblein et al (2002) find that uncertainty arising 
from changes in market demand is positively related to buy (outsourcing) levels. We noted 
above that the real options approach also suggests uncertainty may affect the performance 
outcomes associated with outsourcing.   
We are therefore interested in the effect that market uncertainty has on the 
outsourcing – performance relationship, and specifically in the extent to which it alters the 
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curve hypothesised above.  Empirical results from studies investigating the effects of 
market uncertainty on the level of integration contradict one another (Sutcliffe and Zaheer, 
1998).  Studies utilising TCE provide empirical support that vertical integration / lower 
outsourcing is an efficient response to market uncertainty (e.g., Anderson, 1985).  
Contrarily, studies grounded in RBV suggest that firms facing uncertainty require greater 
flexibility; consequently, uncertainty results in a lowered rather than an increased degree of 
vertical integration, thus more outsourcing.  Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1996) found, 
contrary to TCE, that in highly uncertain situations, firms seek, and do not avoid, alliances.  
The TCE and RBV perspectives therefore suggest that uncertainty creates different optimal 
strategy specifications.   
Galbraith (1973, p. 5) defined market uncertainty as ―the difference between the 
amount of information required to perform the task and the amount of information already 
possessed by the organization.‖  Thus, market uncertainty refers to the cost and 
unpredictability of achieving an optimal expected decision (Galbraith, 1973).  Although the 
reasoning of the TCE and RBV studies mentioned above is implicit, these studies suggest 
that firms seek specific strategy specifications because a high level of market uncertainty 
tends to result in suboptimal strategy specifications.  In other words, in the face of much 
market uncertainty, firm performance is more sensitive to deviations from the optimal level.  
Consequently, we expect that market uncertainty will moderate the effect of outsourcing on 
firms‘ performance such that the higher the market uncertainty, the steeper the negative 
performance effect of firms deviating from their optimal outsourcing position.  In simple 
terms, making mistakes through too much or too little outsourcing is costlier if firms face 
more market uncertainty.  Therefore, we hypothesise: 
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Hypothesis 2:  Market uncertainty negatively moderates the negative 
curvilinear relationship between a firm’s level of outsourcing and its 
performance. 
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
We employ census data covering manufacturing companies operating in the Netherlands. 
Statistics Netherlands collects official data from all Dutch firms and foreign subsidiaries 
with more than 20 employees on an annual basis.  The collected data are quantitative in 
nature. Our sample was limited to firms whose major lines of business belong to the 
assembly industry such as vehicles, electronics and machinery.  A common characteristic of 
these industries is that a manufactured final product is made up of easily identifiable and 
separable components.  The assembly industry is an interesting for a study of outsourcing 
because it engaged in the outsourcing trend long before other industries like services.  
Lessons on outsourcing in the assembly industry may therefore be relevant to other 
industries today or in the future. 
Like in many other countries, outsourcing was a key management trend in the 
Netherlands during the 1990s (de Wit, Mol, and van Drunen, 1998).  In the 1980s 
manufacturing firms had already outsourced some non-core activities.  The current sample 
confirms the trend toward increased outsourcing. During the particular time period under 
study, from 1995, manufacturing firms in the assembly industry increasingly ventured into 
outsourcing important and high-value parts of their production process as well (De Wit et 
al., 1998), which makes it an especially useful time period and industry to look at.  
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A total of 1,147 manufacturing firms were identified in our sample.  These firms are 
spread over 25 separate 3-digit level industries that are coded according to the NACE 
system, which is the European equivalent of the SIC in the United States.  The assembly 
industry as we define it consists of the NACE codes 29 through 35.  A list of all industries 
and numbers of firms therein is provided in Table 1.  This list confirms that there is a wide 
spread of industries in which these firms operate.  A large number of firms in the sample 
are foreign-owned.  Interviews we have held with firms in the sample (reported in Mol, 
2007) suggest that the outsourcing trend in the Netherlands, and the factors driving that 
trend, are highly similar to other countries. Using these basic data a number of firm-level 
measures were developed.  For the present study we use 1995 and 1998 data, since 1998 
was the most recent year available to us. 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 around here 
-------------------------------- 
 
Measures 
Performance. Measuring the financial performance implications of outsourcing is 
challenging. A standard measure of financial performance like ROS is not appropriate 
because it carries a consistent bias towards a negative relationship with outsourcing.  An 
earlier study on vertical integration (D‘Aveni and Ravenscraft, 1994: 1200) noted that with 
outsourcing a firm reduces its costs but also its (nominal) profits.  To measure the 
profitability impact of outsourcing, then, we looked for a more balanced measure that takes 
into account changes in profit levels as a consequence of outsourcing.  We employ the 
return on value added (ROVA).  This measure is calculated as total profitability divided by 
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the firm‘s value added.  The value added is calculated as sales minus external sourcing.  
The ROVA measure is more balanced because if a firm outsources this will not only lower 
the denominator, but the numerator too.  Our empirical data confirm this, since we do not 
observe a consistent linear relationship with outsourcing across different years.  Since our 
theoretical argument suggests that changes over time in a firm‘s outsourcing policy affect 
its performance over time, we refined our measure further by subtracting 1995 ROVA from 
1998 ROVA
3
. 
Outsourcing.  Similar to the criterion variable, the predictor variable must capture changes 
over time
4
. The extent of external sourcing of a business unit was calculated as the ratio of 
industrial purchasing to total sales. This measure indicates to what extent a firm relies on 
external suppliers to produce its own products (a measure similar to Balakrishnan and 
Wernerfelt, 1986).  Our outsourcing definition suggests a comparison of current levels of 
external sourcing with historical levels. So we calculated the variable, outsourcing, by 
subtracting the 1995 ratio of external sourcing from the 1998 ratio.  In order to look at the 
curvilinear effect of outsourcing on performance, we included the square of this measure in 
our models. 
Market Uncertainty. Market uncertainty results in variation in profitability over time.  
Therefore, the uncertainty a firm faces was calculated as the logarithm of the variance in 
                                                          
3
 We ran a series of robustness tests to check whether shorter or longer periods of time generated the same 
findings. We found that our hypotheses are confirmed with other periods as well, but that the explanatory 
value of those models was smaller than is the case for the models we present below with a three-year lag. In 
other words, the three-year time lag we investigate here turned out to be the most suitable lag empirically but 
shorter or longer lags would not substantially change our findings. 
4
 Note that an alternative definition of outsourcing could be the state of a firm‘s activities, rather than the 
changes in that state as we measure outsourcing here. Our measure is in line with the definition we provided 
earlier but we recognise the alternative definition has some merit as well. Our data in fact seem to more or 
less confirm that the main argument of hypothesis 1 holds for this alternative definition as well, which 
strengthens the case for a negatively curvilinear outsourcing-performance relationship. 
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the firm‘s respective return-on-sales figures over six years (1993 to 1998).  In other words, 
we measured to what extent an individual firm‘s profitability fluctuates.  This measure is 
very similar to that used by Leiblein et al (2002). Decision makers will respond to such 
uncertainty in their decisions. 
Control Variables. To control for possible industry level effects, industry dummies were 
added. Since the sample consists of firms from 25 different industries, 24 dummies were 
added to our models. Firm size is another obvious variable to control for in a study of firm 
performance.  To control for firm size, the logarithm of the number of employees of the 
firm in the base year 1995 was used.  In order to look at the effects of firm expansion on 
profitability we also added a sales growth rate measure, calculated as 1998 sales over 1995 
sales.  Another possible explanation for high future profitability may be in the extent to 
which a firm exports its products.  Therefore we calculated the export ratio as exports over 
sales in the base year 1995.  Finally, we added a measure that describes the productivity of 
the firm, the logarithm of the per-employee sales, which is calculated as total sales over the 
number of employees in the base year 1995. 
To analyse the effects of changes in the level of outsourcing on changes in the level 
of ROVA we utilise ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis. It is possible that a 
selection bias exists because the same variables that determine outsourcing also determine 
performance.  To tackle this problem, we use subsample OLS, a technique preferable to its 
alternative, the Heckman correction, under many conditions (Puhani, 2000). This implies 
we run separate regressions for the largest three 3-digit industries (models 2, 3, and 4) to 
check whether our main findings hold for these subsamples. 
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FINDINGS 
In table 2 the means and standard deviations of the independent, dependent, and control 
variables are reproduced along with the correlations between these variables. This table 
reveals an increase in the extent to which these firms relied on outside suppliers between 
1995 and 1998, of 1.07% of sales from 48.75% to 49.82%. This confirms the outsourcing 
trend we discussed earlier. The table also shows a small drop in profitability, as our ROVA 
change measure is negative.  
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 around here 
-------------------------------- 
Table 3 summarises our findings.  In Model 1, we included the control variables and 
market uncertainty in addition to the predictor variables (outsourcing and its squared term) 
to test Hypothesis 1.  In Model 5, designed to test the moderator effect of market 
uncertainty, we added to the base model the following two terms:  outsourcing x 
uncertainty and outsourcing**2 x uncertainty.  Once the two models were estimated, 
Models 1 and 5 were compared.  Under the moderator hypothesis (described by Model 5), 
uncertainty was expected to moderate the effect of outsourcing on performance, the 
estimated slope coefficients for the interaction terms should be significantly different from 
zero, and the explanatory power of Model 5 should be greater than that of Model 1.  If the 
moderating effect were not present, Model 5 should not account for more variance in the 
dependent variable than Model 1, the coefficients for the interaction terms should not 
significantly differ from zero.  Furthermore, when the interaction terms between 
outsourcing and uncertainty are significant, the effect of uncertainty should only be 
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estimated independently of the effect of the interaction terms (Sharma, Durand, and Gur-
Arie, 1981).   
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 around here 
-------------------------------- 
The main hypothesis of a negative curvilinear relationship between outsourcing and 
firm performance is confirmed by Model 1, with a somewhat significant positive slope 
coefficient for the linear outsourcing term (p =.06) and a negative slope coefficient for the 
square term of outsourcing (p < .001).  The explanatory power of Model 1 is 16.0% (p < 
.001).  Models 2, 3, and 4 confirm hypothesis 1.
5
  Thus the subsample OLS is supportive of 
the main hypothesis, which alleviates potential concerns over selection bias. 
In Model 5, both interaction terms are found to be negative and significant (p < .001 
for both).  Uncertainty itself as a main effect in Model 5 is not significant although negative 
and significant in Model 1.  This suggests that uncertainty should not be considered a main 
effect variable but rather a pure moderator variable.  Thus this finding supports hypothesis 
2. The estimated coefficients for the other variables in Model 5 remained consistent with 
those in Model 1, confirming the stability of the research findings.  Model 5 accounts for 
18.4% of the variance in performance, a significant increase of 2.4% from Model 1 
(p<0.01).   
 Among the five control variables other than industry dummies productivity had a 
somewhat negative effect, and sales growth rate had a positive effect on the change in 
ROVA.  While the positive effect of sales growth rate on the change in ROVA is rather 
                                                          
5
 For industries with fewer firms the direction of the effect is also confirmed but statistical significance could 
not be established because of the size of these subsamples. 
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intuitive and as anticipated, the negative effect of productivity on the change in ROVA 
begs for some explanation. Per-employee sales is suggestive of the firm's in-house 
productive capacity.  There appear to be diminishing returns to per-employee sales.  At a 
higher per-employee sales level, further improvement may not generate an improvement in 
the change in ROVA because there is a catching-up effect. 
 
Post hoc analysis 
The effect of uncertainty, which model 5 revealed, can be illustrated further in order to 
show how uncertainty impacts on optimal outsourcing levels.  This is a useful exercise 
because the magnitude of making the right or wrong outsourcing choices under different 
levels of uncertainty will be of particular relevance to managers.  We therefore build up 
three different scenarios. To examine how the change in outsourcing affects performance 
(i.e., the change in ROVA) under various levels of market uncertainty, a partial derivative 
of the curvilinear regression equation is taken with respect to outsourcing and equated to 
zero to determine the value for outsourcing at which the negative curvilinear function 
peaks:   
 
  (performance)                                       
-------------------- = 0.56 - 0.20*(outsourcing) -.14*(uncertainty) - .016*(outsourcing)* (uncertainty) = 0,  
  (outsourcing)        
 
 
The mean of market uncertainty (i.e., the logarithm of the variance in the firm‘s respective 
ROS figures for 6 years) is 3.10, and its standard deviation is 1.27.  Since the effect of 
outsourcing on performance is contingent on market uncertainty, we use three levels of 
market uncertainty (i.e., mean and + one standard deviation away from the mean) for 
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illustrative purposes.  Therefore, the three levels of uncertainty are:  low uncertainty (1.83), 
average uncertainty (3.10), and high uncertainty (4.37).  Substituting these respective 
values for uncertainty in the above partial derivative model, we can evaluate the effect of 
outsourcing on performance under three uncertainty scenarios. 
Scenario 1:  Low market uncertainty 
 
 (performance)                                       
-------------------- = 0.56 - 0.20*(outsourcing) -.14*(1.83) - .016*(outsourcing)* (1.83)   
 (outsourcing)        
 
                              = .30 - .23*(outsourcing) = 0, 
 
 
This partial derivative will stay positive if outsourcing < 1.31; it will become negative if 
outsourcing > 1.31.  In other words, other factors being constant, the effect of outsourcing 
on ROVA would on average be positive as long as the increase in outsourcing did not reach 
1.31% (recall that the base was 48.75% on average).  In a more managerial sense, 
individual firms could on average improve performance by outsourcing activities by as 
much as 1.31% from their current base. It is important to keep in mind that 1.31% is an 
average percentage and will differ strongly across industries and firms. 
 
Scenario 2:  Average market uncertainty 
 
 (performance)                                       
-------------------- = 0.56 - 0.20*(outsourcing) -.14*(3.10) - .016*(outsourcing)* (3.10)   
 (outsourcing)        
 
                              = .12 - .25*(outsourcing) = 0, 
 
 
This partial derivative will stay positive if outsourcing < .48; it will become negative if 
outsourcing > .48.   If the uncertainty level were average, the effect of outsourcing on 
ROVA would be positive as long as the increase in outsourcing, or the increase in the ratio 
 22 
of industrial purchasing to total sales from 1995 to 1998, did not reach .48%.  In other 
words, compared to a low uncertainty scenario, firms would have much less leeway in 
terms of increasing their outsourcing levels under an average uncertainty scenario. 
 
Scenario 3:  High market uncertainty 
 
 (performance)                                       
-------------------- = 0.56 - 0.20*(outsourcing) -.14*(4.37) - .016*(outsourcing)* (4.37)   
 (outsourcing)        
 
                              = -.06 - .27*(outsourcing) = 0, 
 
 
This partial derivative will stay positive if outsourcing < -.23; it will become negative if 
outsourcing > -.23.   If the uncertainty level were high, the effect of outsourcing on ROVA 
would be positive as long as outsourcing had been reduced at least .23% from 1995 to 
1998.  In other words, under a high level of market uncertainty, firms would even have to 
reduce outsourcing activities from their current level. All three scenarios combined, it is 
clear that the higher the market uncertainty, the less flexibility in the level of outsourcing 
activities firms tend to have, providing further support and insight into the second 
hypothesis. 
 
DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS 
Scholars working on the relationship between outsourcing and firm performance have been 
divided into three camps, arguing for a positive or negative effect or no direct effect at all. 
We believe all of these arguments carry some validity in them, but need to be put in 
perspective. We used various theories to show that activities vary in their outsourceability. 
Value chains can be conceived of as a bundle of activities, where a governance choice 
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needs to be made for each activity. Building upon those notions we described how making 
the wrong governance choices is costly and more so as the difference between the optimal 
decision dictated by an activity‘s outsourceability and the actual governance choice 
increases.  
What follows from this is that across all of firm‘s activities, its degree of 
outsourcing is negatively curvilinearly related to its performance. In a linear test of 
outsourcing and performance we may therefore find a positive relationship between 
outsourcing and performance, when firms have not yet reached their optimal point, a 
negative relationship, when firms have gone beyond their optimal point or no relationship 
when a firm is very close to its optimal point. 
At the same time a word of caution is required around the notion of optimisation of 
results. We do not wish to suggest that optimising outsourcing levels is something 
companies actually do, or even that it is desirable. Companies may well be happy with 
satisfactory, rather than optimal results. And in the face of uncertainty and continuous 
change, a static optimisation strategy might lead to worse outcomes, rather than better ones. 
As scholars, with the benefit of hindsight, we can identify optimal strategies but we do not 
want to suggest companies do or indeed should try to engage in continuous optimisation. 
Several empirical limitations of this study should be mentioned.  This study has not 
explicitly included asset specificity or other predictor variables of outsourcing like the 
frequency of transactions or the transferability (stickiness) of resources in its measurement 
models.  Measuring these variables has proven to be difficult even at the level of individual 
transactions and finding a proper measure at the business unit level, where various activities 
are combined, would seem to be even harder. In any case, no such measure was available to 
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us.  Therefore we only tested the moderating effect of uncertainty, and not of other 
variables. 
And the ROVA performance measure used here is only one possible indicator of 
performance. Single indicators always carry some measurement bias. ROVA cannot 
account for the impact of leverage on firm profitability. It can also be susceptible to price 
changes caused by marketplace pressures. And we have assumed here that changes in 
return and changes in value added occur in conjunction. Outsourcing should also be studied 
using ROI or similar measures. Finally, this study operates within a certain geographic and 
temporal context, manufacturing businesses in the Netherlands in the 1990s, and the data 
applied here are now somewhat historical. This is a negative aspect of using secondary 
data. Replication of the findings in other contexts and through other methods is therefore 
very desirable.  
 
IMPLICATIONS 
Whether the relationship between outsourcing and the performance of a firm or a sample of 
firms in a cross-sectional dataset is negative, positive or non-existent is determined by the 
context of measurement.  In a country, industry and time where the outsourcing trend has 
not gone far enough, we may find a positive relationship between the degree of outsourcing 
and firm performance. If however, there is excessive outsourcing at a certain point in time, 
the relationship could become negative. If a firm has found a balance between integration 
and outsourcing, there may not be any relationship. Scholars should be cognisant of their 
context of measurement and use it in explaining cross-sectional findings. Future theorising 
on outsourcing and performance should incorporate the advantages and drawbacks to 
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outsourcing as well as the contingencies that determine the most effective level of 
outsourcing. Thus it would be wrong to propose a linear effect of outsourcing on 
performance at the firm level, be it positive or negative, as this excludes either the 
advantages or the drawbacks from the discussion. And it would be equally wrong to ignore 
that circumstances co-determine what the optimal degree of outsourcing is for a given firm.  
A further point future research could address is whether some firms are able to raise 
their performance outcomes by being better outsourcers. For instance, do the type of value-
creating partnerships between buyers and suppliers seen in ‗transformational outsourcing‘ 
(Linder, 2004) have an impact on the outsourcing-performance curve? It is conceivable that 
being a better outsourcer raises a firm‘s performance curve. Surveying this would allow 
researchers to cross the important bridge between outsourcing and supplier relations as 
these are two strongly related phenomena (Takeishi, 2001). 
Another research direction is to look at shifts in optimal outsourcing levels over 
time. For instance it is stated that the introduction of IT increases the transparency of 
markets, which lowers the costs of transacting in these markets and consequently increases 
the benefits of outsourcing (Malone, Yates, and Benjamin, 1987). And it has also been 
remarked that institutional change, in the form of trade liberalisation and better 
enforcement of intellectual property rights for instance, helps to increase optimal 
outsourcing levels (Mol, 2007). 
The results raise the question why firms would engage in less than optimal 
behaviour. While it exceeds the scope of this article to investigate the causes of such 
misalignment, we would like to suggest some possibilities. First, outsourcing is one of a 
great number of causes of performance and as such the best overall performance will not 
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necessarily come from just optimising the firm‘s outsourcing strategy. It could well be that 
obtaining the best overall performance requires a less than optimal outsourcing strategy. 
Second, it is well known that much managerial decision-making is of a satisficing rather 
than an optimising nature and takes place through the application of heuristics (Simon, 
1957). Hence outsourcing policies can be expected to deviate somewhat from the optimum. 
Third, the nature of this type of decision-making is so complex that much causal ambiguity 
is likely to exist over its impact on performance. And some of this impact will not be felt 
immediately but rather in the long run. Finally, outsourcing decision-making could be 
influenced by bandwagoning effects (Abrahamson and Rosenkopf, 1993). Firms certainly 
appear to be inspired by competitors when making outsourcing decisions and perhaps also 
by other outside institutions. In all this implies that outsourcing often takes on an 
experimental character where optimal strategies are approached at best. This is a further 
avenue for academic research. 
 
Practical implications 
The notion of outsourceability that we have put forward can help practitioners in their 
assessment of the suitability of an activity for outsourcing. Based on our discussion of 
outsourceability, it can broadly be seen as a consequence of past experiences, present 
transaction traits and future strategic intent. Practitioners could use these categories to make 
sense of their portfolio of activities and to rank these activities in terms of their 
outsourceability. 
Most business managers have a strong general sense for what constitutes a sound 
outsourcing policy. They know that outsourcing everything leads to disasters just as much 
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as they know that not all activities should be integrated within firm boundaries. However, 
we would like to suggest the analysis can improve managerial decision-making in two 
important respects. First, managers are often not conscious of the fact there is an optimal 
degree of outsourcing for their entire portfolio. Instead they tend to see the good or evil of 
outsourcing or integrating particular items. Our research suggests a simultaneous focus on 
the portfolio as a whole will help to make better outsourcing decisions. 
Second, managers are in need of guidelines as to where the optimal point lies for 
their particular business at a particular time. We discussed various theories that predict 
outsourceability. Combining these two points it appears that what would really be useful 
from a managerial perspective is a model that helps managers determine what the optimal 
degree of outsourcing is for their particular firm. The development of such a model 
provides an interesting challenge for the academic community. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS  
In this paper we have focused on how outsourcing levels across all activities influence a 
firm‘s overall financial performance. We argued that activities vary in their degree of 
outsourceability, such that it makes sense for activities with high outsourceability to be 
outsourced while activities with low outsourceability are vertically integrated. Using the 
concept of outsourceability we proposed and empirically confirmed that outsourcing has a 
negative curvilinear effect on firm performance, such that there is an optimal degree of 
outsourcing and deviations become ever costlier when moving away from that optimum.  
And as levels of market uncertainty rise, the curve becomes steeper, and mistakes become 
costlier. Through a post hoc analysis, the magnitude of these costs was demonstrated.  The 
 28 
performance implications of outsourcing therefore well deserve their place on managerial 
and research agendas. 
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Table 1 
Industry distribution of firms (total N = 1,147). From revision 1 of statistical 
classification of economic activities in the EU (categories DK, DL and DM) 
 
NACE  
code 
Description N 
291 Machinery for production and use of mechanical power, except aircraft, vehicle 
and cycle engines 
96 
292 Manufacture of other general purpose machinery 272 
293 Manufacture of agricultural and forestry machinery 61 
294 Manufacture of machine-tools 22 
295 Manufacture of other general purpose machinery 200 
297 Manufacture of domestic appliances n.e.c. 20 
300 Manufacture of office machinery and computers 12 
311 Manufacture of electric motors, generators and transformers 25 
312 Manufacture of electricity distribution and control apparatus 24 
313 Manufacture of insulated wire and cable 10 
315 Manufacture of lighting equipment and electric lamps 19 
316 Manufacture of electrical equipment n.e.c. 16 
321 Manufacture of electronic valves and tubes and other electronic components 17 
322 Manufacture of television and radio transmitters and apparatus for line 
telephony and telegraphy 
6 
331 Manufacture of medical and surgical equipment and orthopedic appliances 52 
332 Manufacture of instruments and appliances for measuring, checking, testing, 
navigating and other purposes, except industrial process control equipment 
48 
333 Manufacture of industrial process control equipment 12 
334 Manufacture of optical instruments and photographic equipment 12 
341 Manufacture of motor vehicles 12 
342 Manufacture of bodies (coachwork) for motor vehicles, manufacture of trailers 
and semi-trailers 
79 
343 Manufacture of parts and accessories for motor vehicles and their engines 21 
351 Building and repairing of ships and boats 81 
353 Manufacture of aircraft and spacecraft 6 
354 Manufacture of motorcycles and bicycles 19 
355 Manufacture of other transport equipment n.e.c. 5 
 
Table 2 
Means, standard deviations and correlations among key variables  
*** significant at .001; ** significant at .01; * significant at .05; † significant at .10. 
 
 Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 ROVA change -.49 24.32 1          
2 Firm Size 4.09 .83 -.03 1         
3 Sales Growth Rate 25.92 42.27 .31
(***)
 .02 1        
4 Export Ratio 35.93 34.46 -.02 .37
(***)
 .05
(†)
 1       
5 Productivity 5.36 .44 -.10
(**)
 .21
(***)
  -.10
(**)
 .27
(***)
  1      
6 Uncertainty 47.19 76.01 -.10
(**)
 -.11
(***)
 .01 .08
(***)
 -.14
(***)
 1     
7 Outsourcing 1.07 11.43 .07
(*)
 .00 .11
(***)
  -.05
(†)
 -.06
(*)
 -.05 1    
8 Outsourcing**2 131.72 270.91 -.14
(***)
 .03 .01 .04 .07
(*)
 .19
(***)
 .10
(**)
 1   
 
 
 2 
Table 3 
Regression Models (slope coefficients and standard errors) for the Effect of the Change in Outsourcing 
on the Change in Return on Value Added (between 1995 and 1998). 
*** significant at .001; ** significant at .01; * significant at .05; † significant at .10. 
 
 Model 1 
All industries 
Model 2 
Industry  291 
Model 3 
Industry 292 
Model 4 
Industry 295 
Model 5 
All industries 
 Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE 
(Constant) 26.27 10.15
(**)
 31.18 30.73 -5.06 18.68 56.58 22.82
(*)
 22.06     10.04
(*)
 
Firm Size -.50 .92 -5.12 2.92
(†)
 .54 1.75 2.69 2.17 -.75       .91 
Sales Growth Rate .18 .02
(***)
 .05 .05 .18 .03
(***)
 .18 .04
(***)
 .17       .02
(***)
 
Export Ratio -.00 .02 .09 .08 .03 .04 -.05 .05 -.01       .02 
Productivity -4.22 1.72
(*)
 -2.12 5.43 -.10 3.30 -12.83 4.10
(**)
 -4.12     1.67
(*)
 
Uncertainty -1.64 .57
(**)
 .06 .03
(†)
 .01 .02 -.05 .02
(*)
 -.32       .61 
Outsourcing .11 .06
(*)
 .49 .19
(*)
 -.01 .12 -.39 .13
(**)
 .56       .17
(***)
 
Outsourcing**2 -.01 .00
(***)
 -.03 .01
(***)
 -.03 .01
(***)
 -.02 .01
(**)
 -.01       .00
(***)
 
Outsourcing x Uncertainty         -.14       .04
(***)
 
Outsourcing**2 x Uncertainty         -.01       .00
(***)
 
           
N 1,147 96 272 200 1,147 
R
2
 .16 .29 .22 .22 .18 
Adj. R
2
 .14 .23 .20 .20 .16 
F-value  7.05
(***)
 5.12
(***)
 10.88
(***)
 7.87
(***)
 7.86
(***)
 
Note:  Industry dummy variables are not shown for the sake of brevity but are available upon request.  
 
